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In Re Seagate:  Did it Really Fix the Waiver Issue? 
A Short Review and Analysis of Waiver Resulting 
from the Use Of a Counsel’s Opinion Letter as a 
Defense to Willful Infringement 
INTRODUCTION 
This past summer the Federal Circuit, responding to a writ of 
mandamus, attempted to fix the quagmire nearly a quarter century in 
the making that started with Underwater Devices1 and culminated most 
recently in In re Echostar. 2 In particular, the court sought to definitively 
determine the various consequences of an assertion of willful 
infringement by a patentee. Principally, should a party’s assertion of an 
advice-of-counsel defense in response to a patentees contention of 
willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege and 
work product immunity to communications with the defense’s litigation 
counsel?3   
Ironically, Echostar—which instigated the writ of mandamus—itself 
was an attempt by the Federal Circuit to resolve uncertainty 
surrounding the extent of a waiver of attorney-client privilege—
subsequent to the disclosure of an attorney opinion letter as a defense to 
a willful infringement of a patent.  Instead, Echostar led to greater 
confusion, particularly among the district courts.   
A global analysis of waiver of privilege and immunity is beyond the 
scope of this Paper.  What is of most concern to this author is only one 
of the questions addressed by the court:  whether the production of an 
opinion letter not only waives privilege with regard to opinion counsel, 
but even encroaches on the work product immunity of an unaffiliated 
trial counsel.4
  1.   Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (1983) 
  2.   In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter 
EchoStar]. 
  3.   In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
4. Note that the concerns regarding the eroding nature of attorney-client privilege in 
the face of increasing waiver are not limited to patent law.  See, e.g., Mini-Conference on 
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine:  Hearing Before the Advisory 
Comm. on Evidence Rules on Proposal 502 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules/advcomm-miniconference.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).  See also Griffin B. Bell et 
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Those courts that allow for the aforementioned waiver to extend to 
trial counsel base their rulings on the concern that a determination of 
willfulness requires an understanding of the complete environment of 
the putative infringer, including the information that he or she is getting 
from his or her counsel.  If an infringer uses counsel’s advice implying 
that he or she was not infringing as a defense to willfulness, it stands to 
reason that the court should examine all of the potential opinions that 
he or she received relating to willfulness to ascertain the true mindset of 
the infringer, including those opinions of trial counsel.5
This expansive notion of waiver, adopted by numerous courts 
leading up to the Seagate decision is somewhat problematic.   Not only 
does it chill frank discussion between a defendant and her lawyer, but it 
perversely incentivizes potential infringers to limit the scope and 
breadth of their understanding vis a vis the infringement at hand.  The 
fewer attorneys involved in determining infringement, the better.  The 
putative infringer is better off getting an opinion letter and never 
discussing the issue ever again even with other counsel for fear that their 
conversation and work product will become available to the patent 
holder.  It also incentivizes patentees to claim willfulness on any 
occasion given the huge payoff it can provide:  either the defendant 
provides a an opinion letter, opening up a treasure trove of formerly 
privileged documents, or the defendant chooses to retain her privilege 
and take her chances with the willfulness claim.  If she loses she may be 
liable for treble damages. 
al., Letter to Attorney General Gonzales re Proposed Revisions to Department of Justice Policy 
Regarding Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/ag_sept52006.pdf. 
 5.  Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (“the EchoStar decision held that if a defendant relies on the advice-of-
counsel defense with respect to advice received from in-house counsel, then the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege applies to advice ‘relating to the same subject matter’ received from 
other counsel”).  See, also, Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77077 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 20, 2006). 
The Special Master's holding that the waiver extends to trial counsel is consistent 
with EchoStar. . . . [Which] held that “all opinions received by the client relating to 
infringement must be revealed, even if they come from defendants' trial attorney.” . 
The supporting citation to Akeva in describing the scope of the waiver, together 
with the reasoning of the Echostar Court, indicates to this Court that the Federal 
Circuit would extend the waiver to all attorneys who provided advice, including, in 
the case of ongoing infringement, trial counsel. Excluding trial counsel from the 
scope of the waiver would permit a party to use the attorney-client privilege as both 
a sword and shield by allowing a party to choose which opinions are disclosed and 
which are not. 
(citations omitted). 
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This Comment outlines the basic issues of privilege and immunity, 
presents the history of uncertainty regarding waiver leading up to the 
recent Seagate decision, examines the potential outcome of the decision, 
and presents possible resolutions to further resolve the issue and more 
fully repair attorney-client privilege and immunity.  One caveat, the 
ubiquitously inaccurate and inconsistent usage of the terminology 
related to privilege and immunity serves only to confuse the issue and 
the courts, and potentially this author.  Establishing a consistent usage 
of the terms used in court cases and in the literature may be a start to 
reaching a clear, consistent, and fair rule. 
I.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Attorney-client privilege is an integral component of our adversarial 
legal system; despite its importance the bounds of the right continue to 
remain unclear.6  While its exact historical origins are unknown7—it is 
either a utilitarian, social-good justification or a moral rights concept8—
the right in its current incarnation in the U.S. judicial system stems from 
statute and legislation; it is not as of yet seen as a constitutional right.9
In 1972, the Supreme Court proposed a series of privileges to be 
codified.10  The mere suggestion of codification drew such passionate 
criticism, it nearly destroyed the entire process of evidentiary rule 
revision.11  Thus, instead of any particular sets of privilege rules, the 
Rules of Evidence state succinctly, “the privilege of a witness, person, 
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by 
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the 
6. See In re Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (“While the 
privilege confers important social benefits, it also exacts significant costs.  It runs counter to 
the ordinary judicial interest in the disclosure of all relevant evidence.”)  But see Daniel R. 
Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33 (1998) (“Confidentiality 
rules—the ethical duty of confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege, and the work product 
doctrine—benefit lawyers but are of dubious value to clients and society as a whole.  Absent 
some more compelling justification for their existence than has been advanced to date, these 
doctrines should be abolished.”). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 873 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting 
Roman law roots). 
8. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
1450, 1501 (1985). 
9. "Standing alone, the attorney-client privilege is merely a rule of evidence; it has not 
yet been held a constitutional right."  Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
10. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 769 (2002). 
11. Id. at 769-70. 
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courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.”12  
According to later interpretations by the Supreme Court, this 
terminology reflects Congress’s “affirmative intention not to freeze the 
law of privilege. . . . [and] to ‘provide the courts with the flexibility to 
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.’”13
Importantly, the Court, in formulating the bounds of attorney-client 
privilege, rejected any balancing or other tests that could create 
uncertainty in the application of the principle of attorney-client 
privilege, noting “participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be 
able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular 
discussions will be protected.  An uncertain privilege, or one which 
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the 
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.’”14
 In outlining the privilege, the courts have determined that  
[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the 
privilege is or sought to be come a client; (2) . . . (b)[t]he 
attorney] in connection with this communication is acting as a 
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the 
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence 
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an 
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some 
legal proceeding . . . and (4) the  privilege has been (a) claimed 
and (b) not waived by the client.15
Privilege may be waived by the client in some circumstances where 
either the client or attorney testifies about attorney-client 
communications; through voluntary disclosure or sometimes inadvertent 
disclosure;16 or when the client puts the communication at issue—the 
waiver type most pertinent to the issue at hand.17
12. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
13. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 40891 
(1974)). 
14. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 
U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
15. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir. 1998) (Voluntary 
disclosure of attorney[-]client communications expressly waives the privilege.  The waiver 
covers any information directly related to that which was actually disclosed.”) (citations 
omitted)  See also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[P]rivilege must be 
jealously guarded by the holder of the privilege lest it be waived.  The courts will grant no 
greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their own precautions warrant. . . . 
[T]he privilege is lost even if the disclosure is inadvertent.” (citations omitted)). 
17. “The privilege which protects attorney-client communications may not be used 
both as a sword and a shield.  Where a party raises a claim which in fairness requires 
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II.  WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY 
A related but different right18 limits access to the attorney’s work 
product prepared in anticipation of a litigation.19  Historically, immunity 
existed in the federal common law20 until it was tacitly endorsed by 
Hickman21 and finally included in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.22  In Hickman, the Supreme Court ruled that access to 
opposing counsel’s work product 
contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution 
and defense of legal claims.  Not even the most liberal of 
discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files 
and the mental impressions of an attorney. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an 
attorney’s course of preparation is so well recognized and so 
essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure 
that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to 
establish adequate reasons to justify production through a 
subpoena or court order.23
Despite this rhetoric, the Court did go on to qualify the extent of 
disclosure of the protected communication, the privilege may be implicitly waived.”  Chevron 
Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
18. Courts even sometimes confuse the two.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 915(3)(C) Introductory Note (2000) (“The rules governing waiver 
and exception applicable to work-product material generally parallel those for the attorney-
client privilege.”)  See also United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Together with All Bldgs., 
Improvements, Appurtenances, and Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to 
the “attorney work product privilege”); Thomas E. Spahn, Ten Differences Between the Work 
Product Doctrine and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 VA. LAW. 45 (Oct. 1997).  But see 
Praxair, Inc. v. Atmi, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 473, 480 n. 9 (D. Del. 2006) (“Attorney-client 
privilege and work product are two concepts that are treated quite differently and, in the eyes 
of the law, are independent legal concepts.  It does not follow that a waiver of one necessarily 
means, or ought to mean, a waiver of the other" (citation omitted). 
19. Work product includes the following:  “(1) evidence and other facts collected by 
the lawyer and her agents; (2) research collected and memoranda prepared by the lawyer; 
and (3) thoughts, opinions, and mental impressions formed by the lawyer (and typically 
committed to writing) about the case or the participants in the litigation.”  Fred C. Zacharias, 
Who Owns Work Product?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 127, 130 (2006).  Note that the work product 
need not have been prepared for that particular litigation where the immunity is being 
asserted.  See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 967 (3d Cir. 1997). 
20. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, 19 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE JURISDICTION § 4514 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing what is 
federal common law).  Note, however, that the concept is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
21. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11 (1947). 
22. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(3). 
23. Hickman, 429 U.S. at 510-12. 
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work product immunity:  “We do not mean to say that all written 
materials obtained or prepared by an adversary’s counsel with an eye 
toward litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases.”24
Subsequent courts have extended work product immunity beyond 
the simple meaning of Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3)25 to a privilege-like 
immunity for oral statements of the attorney that might embody that 
attorney’s work product or mental impressions.26
Work product can also be divided into two distinct categories: 
factual and opinion. Factual work product27 can only be divulged “upon 
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the 
materials . . . and that the party is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.”28  In 
contrast, opinion work product is subject to more stringent limitations 
on disclosure.29  Some courts have even interpreted Rule 26(b)(3) to 
provide absolute protection to this element of work product.30  The 
24. Id. at 511. 
 25.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
Trial Preparation:  Materials. 
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover 
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 
26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if: 
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and 
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its 
case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by 
other means. 
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those 
materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning 
the litigation. 
Id. 
  26.  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is clear from 
Hickman that work product protection extends to both tangible and intangible work 
product.”); United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Together with all Bldgs, Improvements, 
Appurtenances, and Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996) (“When applying the work 
product privilege to . . . nontangible information, the principles enunciated in Hickman apply, 
as opposed to Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies only to 
‘documents and tangible things.’”) (citations omitted). 
27. Factual work product can include factual case summaries, chronological 
assessments, memos, or interview reports (SEC category I information). 
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
29. Opinion work product typically includes documents relating to a counsel’s mental 
impressions. 
30. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 732 
(4th Cir. 1974) (“[O]pinion work product material, as distinguished from material not 
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Supreme Court in Upjohn, while not deciding what showing is necessary 
for the divulgence of opinion work product, implied that there could still 
be specific instances where even this immunity would not stand.31  
Subsequently, some federal courts have, in some instances, waived 
opinion work product immunity:32  Under current Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure  work product can be produced if 
the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to 
prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their 
substantial equivalent by other means. 
. . . If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must 
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other 
representative concerning the litigation.33
Confusingly, the theory underpinning the work product doctrine is 
distinct from the rationale supporting its waiver.  Simplistically, work 
product immunity is designed to allocate information between 
adversarial parties in litigation,34 outlining the bounds of what 
information ought to be shared between two parties in suit.35  It is 
essentially an evidentiary issue.  In contrast to the immunity itself, 
waiver hinges on issues relating to attorney professional responsibility 
to the client.  This confusing nature of the work product doctrine has fed 
the debate over who owns the waiver right.  The American Law 
Institute implies that the ultimate decision is that of the client.36  
containing mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, is immune from 
discovery.”). 
31. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981). 
32. See, e.g., G. Michael Halfenger, Comment, The Attorney Misconduct Exception to 
the Work Product Doctrine, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082-86 (1991). 
  33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
34. See In re ANR Advance Transp. Co., 302 B.R. 607, 615-17 (E.D. Wis. 2003) 
(providing a more thorough discussion on the nature of the doctrine). 
35. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988). 
While the attorney-client privilege is intended to promote communication between 
attorney and client by protecting client confidences, the work-product privilege is a 
broader protection, designed to balance the needs of the adversary system:  
promotion of an attorney's preparation in representing a client versus society’s 
general interest in revealing all true and material facts to the resolution of a dispute. 
Id. 
36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 90 cmt. c 
(2000).  
So long as doing so is not inconsistent with the interests of the client, a lawyer may 
invoke immunity on the basis of the lawyer’s independent interest in privacy.  When 
lawyer and client have conflicting wishes or interests with respect to work-product 
material, the lawyer must follow instruction of the client. 
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Professor Zacharias asserts that many jurisdictions consider waiver to 
be owned by the attorney.37
While the issue of work product immunity has also come under fire 
as a result of the EchoStar ruling,38 a fuller examination is beyond the 
scope of this relatively short discussion. 
III.  WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT OF A PATENT39
In addition to injunctions and compensatory damages, courts have 
the opportunity to attach damage multipliers, punitive damages, and 
lawyers’ fees to patent infringement penalties;40 currently, the most 
common reason for increased damages is willful infringement.41
Although the term “willful” is widely used without any consistency 
in statutes and case law, “it is generally understood to refer to conduct 
that is not merely negligent.”42  Willful infringement represents the 
notion “that patent infringement, like other civil wrongs, is disfavored, 
and intentional disregard of legal rights warrants deterrence.”43  Note 
that even the Federal Circuit admits to the lack of a good definition of 
willfulness:44
Willfulness . . . is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of 
degree. . . .  [It] may range from unknowing, or accidental, to 
deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a patentee’s legal rights.  The 
role of a finding of ”willfulness” in the law of infringement is 
partly as a deterrent—an economic deterrent to the tort of 
Id. 
37. Zacharias, supra note 19, at 135. 
38. See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 127 S. Ct. 846 (2006) (denying 
certiorari). 
39.  Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
[T]he Supreme Court has observed that the word willful is widely used in the law, 
and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent 
interpretation, it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely 
negligent . . . .  The concept of willful infringement is not simply a conduit for 
enhancement of damages; it is a statement that patent infringement, like other civil 
wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal rights warrants deterrence. 
Id. 
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
41. 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03(1)(b)(v) (2002). 
42. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. 
43. Id. 
44. “There are no hard and fast rules regarding a finding of willfulness.”  Graco, Inc. v. 
Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  But see, e.g., Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 
F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (establishing a three-factor test for willfulness). 
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infringement—and partly as a basis for making economically 
whole one who has been wronged . . . .  
. . . [It]  reflects a threshold of culpability in the act of 
infringement that, alone or with other considerations of the 
particular case, contributes to the court’s assessment of the 
consequences of patent infringement.45
Central to this idea is that willfulness is a determination of the 
defendant’s state of mind.46  A factual finding of willful infringement 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.47  Once a court 
has found a willful infringement, there is the potential for,48 although 
not a guaranteed finding of, increased damages.49
With the perpetual threat of increased damages, and the difficulty in 
getting willfulness reversed on appeal,50 potential infringers principally 
defend themselves through showing that they acted on advice of 
counsel,51 a technique that often works, even when that opinion is later 
45. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  See also 
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  
The issue of willful infringement measures the infringing behavior, in the 
circumstances in which the infringer acted, against an objective standard of 
reasonable commercial behavior in the same circumstances. . . .  [It is] a measure of 
reasonable commercial behavior in the context of the tort of patent infringement 
[including] [t]he extent to which the infringer disregarded the property rights of the 
patentee, the deliberateness of the tortious acts, . . . [and] other manifestations of 
unethical or injurious commercial conduct . . . . 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
46. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
47. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“Willfulness is a question of fact to be proven by clear and convincing evidence . . . because 
the boundary between unintentional and culpable acts is not always bright”) (citations 
omitted)). 
48. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826.  
An award of enhanced damages . . . is committed to the discretion of the trial court.  
While no statutory standard dictates the circumstances under which the district 
court may exercise its discretion, this court has approved such awards where the 
infringer acted in wanton disregard of the patentee’s patent rights, that is, where the 
infringement is willful. 
Id. 
49. “[F]inding of willful infringement merely authorizes, but does not mandate, an 
award of increased damages.”  Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (first emphasis added). 
50. See, e.g., Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & 
Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that 
a “district court's finding of willful infringement is a finding of fact, reviewable under the 
clearly erroneous standard”) (emphasis added). 
51. See Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 
(Fed. Cir. 1983).  If the defendant “has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an 
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found to be wrong.52
The specter of a willful infringement decision against the defendant 
in a patent infringement suit creates not only a reality where most 
clients are advised by their attorneys to not read patents,53 which 
undermines a principle component of the patent system and impedes 
information and the dissemination of knowledge,54 but it also creates a 
Hobson’s choice for the potential infringer.55  She can choose to rely on 
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing.”  Id. at 
1389.  Underwater also provides a list of criteria necessary to evaluate the sufficiency of an 
advice of counsel letter.  Id. at 1390.  In particular, Underwater focuses at looking to the four 
corners of the opinion letter.  Id.  Note, however, that failure to receive advice of counsel 
does not create an “adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been 
unfavorable.”  Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Knorr-Bremse overturned a nearly twenty-year-old decision 
wherein a defendant’s “silence on the subject, in alleged reliance on the attorney-client 
privilege, would warrant the conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so 
and was advised that its importation and sale of the accused products would be an 
infringement of valid U.S. patents.”  Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  Note additionally that advice of counsel is not always an adequate 
defense to willful infringement.  The courts often recognize that counsel's opinion on validity 
is evidence to be weighed towards a determination of good faith; it is not dispositive.  Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1969).  It is necessary to look at “the 
totality of the circumstances presented in [the] case.”  Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1390. 
52. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1988).  The attorney’s opinion, 
although later shown to be incorrect, contained significant, scientifically based 
objective factors to justify Valles’ conclusion of no infringement.  He contrasted 
Valles’ opinion to those in other cases which lacked any appearance of competence, 
authoritativeness, or internal indicia of credibility, which, he recognized, are some of 
the important factors to consider when evaluating an opinion letter. 
Id. at 1579.  But see Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (finding that “the attorney’s advice, based solely on file history prior art, does not by 
itself raise an inference of good faith substantial enough to convince us that the trial court’s 
determination of willful infringement was clearly erroneous”) (second emphasis added). 
53. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness 
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1102 (2003) (discovering that “experienced patent 
lawyers often advise their clients to avoid reading patents in order to avoid liability for 
willfulness”). 
54. “This undermines one of the principal purposes of the patent system—to make 
others aware of innovations that could help stimulate further innovation.”  BD. ON SCI., 
TECH., AND ECON. POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, and Mark B. Myers, Eds., 
National Academies Press) (2004) [hereinafter NAS Report].  The NAS Report also notes 
that the issue of willfulness is asserted in most cases and often overshadows much of the 
litigation.  Id. at 184. 
55. Note also that a lawyer’s advice regarding this choice also becomes a Hobson’s 
choice: 
Any lawyer advising a client about the practical realities arising from the Fromson 
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her opinion counsel’s advice as a defense but risk waiving all related 
attorney-client privilege,56 or she can choose to forego the defense in 
defending a charge of willful infringement.57  Even more disconcerting is 
the continuing uncertainty regarding the extent of the waiver because it 
may waive even trial counsels’ privileges and immunities related to the 
issue of willful infringement.58
doctrine, [the first Hobson choice], also faces a Hobson’s choice.  Rule 2.1 of the 
ABA Model Rules . . . requires a lawyer to advise the client candidly as to all risks 
and strategies in a case.  By giving candid advice, however, a lawyer places the client 
at risk if the opinion either must be disclosed subsequently or an adverse inference 
drawn from refusing to disclose the opinion.  The lawyer’s only alternative is to 
produce a sanitized opinion in the nature of a brief with the expectation that it will 
be disclosed. 
Under Fromson, the lawyer’s opinion becomes part and parcel of the client's 
defense at trial.  The sanitized opinion comes at the cost of candor.  A rule that 
punishes non-disclosure not only undermines the privilege but may well tarnish the 
advice given. 
Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at *5-6, 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (No. 01-1357), 2003 WL 23200567, available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/amicus_ 
brief.doc (last visited December 20, 2006).  Ad hoc exceptions to the privilege may also cause 
“general erosion.”  Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998).  Thus, 
Fromson penalizes candor and changes what should be candid advice into advocacy. 
56. “A survey of patent case law has convinced this court that the use of the advice of 
counsel defense waives the attorney-client privilege.”  Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey 
Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
57. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 832-33 
(N.D. Ill. 1987), opining that 
in patent cases, the waiver rule creates a cruel dilemma for one accused of willful 
infringement.  While reliance on advice of counsel is not necessary per se to defend 
the suit, it is, as a practical matter, absolutely essential to the good faith defense.  
Thus the choice is between a complete sacrifice of the privilege or a complete 
sacrifice of the defense. 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
58. Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1770.
Some courts have found that the invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives 
both the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity.  Certainly, principles 
of fairness as enunciated with respect to the attorney-client privilege seem just as 
applicable to the work product immunity.  If a party is going to attack another 
party's reliance on advice of counsel, information covered by the work product 
immunity would aid in that attack. 
Id. (citation omitted).  In some instances this may even go to mental impressions of the 
attorney.  Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1976).  The 
court found 
that in the particular circumstances of [that] case, [the] plaintiff ha[d] made a 
sufficient showing of substantial need and undue hardship to overcome the qualified 
immunity from discovery for non-mental impression work product . . . .  [and that 
there was not] an absolute immunity from discovery for opinion work product, 
barring disclosure of such material under any circumstances 
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IV.  UNCERTAINTY IN THE EXTENT OF WAIVER 
Especially troubling for alleged infringers mounting a defense 
against a willful infringement claim prior to the recent Seagate decision 
has been the uncertainty regarding the extent of their waiver once they 
produce the opinion letter.59  This pervasive problem may have resulted 
from courts inconsistently applying vague or unrelated precedent to a 
very fact-specific question.60  Thus, Courts differ with regard to (1) 
whose law to apply;61 (2) whether work product immunity is always 
waived along with privilege;62 (3) whether it makes a difference if the 
opinion work product is oral or written;63 (4) whether an attorney’s 
Id.  See also Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 98C7598, 1999 WL 89570, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 12, 1999) (“The assertion of an advice of counsel defense results in a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege.  Courts have held that the advice of counsel defense results in a 
waiver of the attorney work product protection as well.”) (citations omitted). 
59. “[T]here is considerable division of opinion about how far (if at all) the waiver 
extends to work product that counsel generated before the suit was filed but did not share 
with the defendant.”  Sharper Image Corp. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 621, 624 n.4 
(N.D. Cal. 2004).  “‘An uncertain privilege—or one which purports to be certain, but rests in 
widely varying applications by the courts—is little better than no privilege.’”  Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re von Bulow, 828 
F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
60. Courts have applied the precedents to achieve any number of desired results.  
While all the options have been available as judicial precedents, “the trick is to look over the 
heads in the crowds and pick out your friends.”  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 36 (Princeton University Press 1997) (quoting J. Harold Leventhal). 
61. See Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1197-98 (W.D. Mich. 1997) 
(finding that for this issue, Federal Circuit law controls).  But see Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. 
E'Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (D. Nev. 2003) (deciding that the regional 
circuit law controls).  Although note that 
there is no such thing as the ”law of the district.”  Even where the facts of a prior 
district court case are, for all practical purposes, the same as those presented to a 
different district court in the same district, the prior “resolution of those claims does 
not bar reconsideration by this Court of similar contentions.  The doctrine of stare 
decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the decision of another.” 
Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 
62. Compare Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del. 2003) (refusing 
to adopt the idea that a “waiver of the attorney client privilege is ipso facto a decision to 
waive the protections of the work product doctrine”), with Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc. v. 
DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“The waiver principle 
applies to work product immunity as well as to the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, where 
a party asserts the advice of counsel as an essential element of its defense, work product 
immunity, like attorney-client privilege, is waived with respect to the subject of that advice.”) 
(citation omitted). 
63. See, e.g., Variable-Parameter Fixture Dev. Corp. v. Morpheus Lights, Inc., 31 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1158, 1160  (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (distinguishing precedence, noting that the Plaintiff 
“has demonstrated a substantial need for . . . [counsel’s documents], given that the opinion 
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opinion work product immunity is also waived;64 (5) whether immunity 
regarding information not provided to the client is included in the 
waiver;65 (6) the extent of the waiver in terms of subject matter;66 (7) the 
provided by the Rosenblum firm was given orally.  Thus, access to all documents before the 
opinion provider is essential to cross-examination.”). 
64. See, e.g., Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 
1992) (finding that opinion work product is discoverable where the “mental impressions [of 
counsel] are at issue and the need for the material is compelling”) (emphasis omitted). 
65. See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(compelling a law firm to provide the entire file relating to the opinion letter including 
documents that were never provided to the defendant).  See also Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. 
Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D. Del. 2000).  
[B]y limiting the waiver of the privilege only to those matters which are 
communicated to the client, Thorn and its progeny have effectively encouraged 
patent counsel to place only the most favorable version of the facts and the law in 
their opinion letters, even if these attorneys are aware of other information which is 
far less helpful to their client. 
Id.  Contra Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc., v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 622 (D. Del. 
1993) (“[T]he determination of a claim of willful infringement relate[s] to the infringer’s state 
of mind.  Counsel’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not 
probative of that state of mind unless they have been communicated to that client.”). 
66. See Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect 
to all documents that pertained to the infringement of the patent); Steelcase, 954 F. Supp. at 
1198-99 (requiring that the opinion be produced without redaction, even irrelevant 
information, and including all documents that refer or relate, or documents that could be the 
basis for the opinion letter); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs. Mfg., 206 F.R.D. 396, 399 
(D. Del. 2002).  The court found  
it is critical for the patentee to have a full opportunity to probe, not only the state of 
mind of the infringer, but also the mind of the infringer's lawyer upon which the 
infringer so firmly relied.  There is no reason why the alleged infringer's waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege should not be considered absolute, encompassing 
materials typically protected by the work product doctrine. 
. . . . 
. . . [And ruling that] because Eon has relied on the advice of counsel defense, the 
Court concludes that Eon has waived any privilege that may pertain to those 
documents and communications related in any way to its counsel's opinion. 
Id.  Contra Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 1991) 
(“[I]n patent cases, courts generally construe the scope of the subject matter waiver 
narrowly.”); Thorn, 837 F. Supp. at 622 (“The facts of consequence to the determination of a 
claim of willful infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind.  Counsel's mental 
impression, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not probative of that state of mind 
unless they have been communicated to that client”); Dunhall Pharms., Inc. v. Discus Dental, 
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (rejecting “the contention that by asserting an 
advice of counsel defense to willful infringement, the Defendants were required to waive 
attorney client privilege and work product protections on each subject matter addressed in 
the opinion letters, i.e., infringement, validity and enforceability.”); Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. 
v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D. Mass. 2000) (“The issue of infringement is 
distinct from the issues of validity and enforceability . . . .  [W]aiver of the attorney-client 
privilege as to one issue does [not] serve as a waiver of the privilege as to all issues.”) 
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temporal extent of the waiver—i.e., at what time point is subsequent 
attorney client discussion and work product no longer part of the 
waived component;67 and, most important for this discussion, (8) 
whether waiver by one counsel will affect other counsel’s (most 
distressingly trial counsel’s) privileges and immunities.68  Without any 
consensus among the courts as to the extent of waiver, lawyers and their 
clients cannot accurately calculate the costs and benefits of an advice of 
counsel defense.  EchoStar was a failed effort by the Federal Circuit to 
clear up this issue and the direct impetus for the Seagate decision. 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
67. See, e.g., Dunhall, 994 F. Supp. at 1206 (finding that waiver applies only to 
documents produced “up to the time that the lawsuit was filed”).  While likely related to the 
subject matter of the asserted defense, information produced for trial is fundamentally 
different from a similar pre-litigation analysis.  In comparison to work product produced 
prior to the filing of the lawsuit, litigation-related work product deserves greater protection.  
Id.  See also Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Techs., Inc., No. 01C4182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655, at 
*7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2002) (limiting waiver to advice defendant received before suit was 
filed); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (S.D. Ind. 
2001) (ruling that waiver does not extend past the start of trial); Hoover Universal, Inc. v. 
Graham Packaging Corp., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596, 1598 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that waiver is 
“limited to documents created prior to May 17, 1995, the date the first complaint was filed”).  
Contra Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (“[T]he 
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection covers all points of time, 
including up through trial.”); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 n.4 
(E.D. Cal. 2001) (“[T]emporal scope of the work product waiver necessarily [does not end] 
with the filing of the litigation.”); Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp., No. 96C3833, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17753, *13 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 1998) (“[T]he waiver does not cease as of the date 
an opinion letter is authored.”); McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus. Inc., 21 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1412, 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“[I]t is not appropriate . . . for the waiving parties or 
judge to limit the waiver on a temporal basis.”); Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. 
Supp. 977, 980-82 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd, 758 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that a waiver of 
privilege on counsel's also applied to later communications on the same subject). 
68. Compare Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1191 (D.S.C. 
1974) (limiting waiver to “all communications between the same attorney and the same client 
on the same subject made before the privileged document was voluntarily waived”); Chiron, 
179 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 n.5 (“The court does not hold that litigation counsel opinion would 
necessarily be immune from discovery.”); Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365 (waiver 
extends to work product of trial counsel expressed to defendant which contain “potentially 
damaging information” and/or express “grave reservations” respecting the opinion letter) 
(emphasis in original), with Beneficial Franchise Co. v. Bank One, 205 F.R.D. 212, 218 (N.D. 
Ill. 2001) (“[F]airness is served by allowing the opposing party to have access to documents 
casting doubt or contradicting those opinions—even if prepared by trial counsel after suit was 
commenced.”); Thermos Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17753 at *13 (ordering “[d]efendants to 
produce only those documents authored by their present trial counsel which (1) counsel 
communicated to Defendants and (2) contain conclusions that contradict or cast doubt” on 
the opinion letters). 
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V.  ECHOSTAR 
Prior to EchoStar, the Federal Circuit, in an en banc decision, ruled 
that no adverse assumption could be made regarding a defendant’s 
decision to not claim an advice of counsel defense against a charge of 
willful infringement.69  Nevertheless defendants continue to use the 
defense of advice of counsel even considering the uncertain 
consequences.70
EchoStar was sued by TiVo for patent infringement on patent 
number 6,233,389—“a multimedia time warping system.”71  Prior to the 
filing of the suit, EchoStar looked to in-house counsel for an opinion as 
to the potential infringement on TiVo’s patents.  Subsequent to the suit, 
EchoStar sought, but initially ignored, further advice from outside 
counsel, Merchant & Gould.  The district court ruled that in relying on 
its in-house counsel for a defense against willful infringement, EchoStar 
waived both attorney-client privilege and work product immunity, with 
regard to both in-house counsel and Merchant & Gould, and that the 
scope of the waiver included communications made either before 
or after the filing of the complaint and any work product, 
whether or not the product was communicated to EchoStar. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [As the] documents could be relevant or lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence because they might contain information 
that was conveyed to EchoStar, even if the documents were not 
themselves conveyed.72
Seeing an opportunity to set the record straight on waiver, the 
Federal Circuit allowed an appeal.  Citing Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems v. Medtronic, Inc.,73 the court first made it clear that given the 
patent focus of the inquiry, the decision would be based not on regional 
circuit law, but on Federal Circuit law.74
Next, citing Akeva,75 the Federal Circuit noted that there was no 
69. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been 
unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion 
of counsel, is no longer warranted.  Precedent authorizing such inference is overruled.”) 
70. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 
FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 228 (2004). 
71. Patent 6,233,389 (filed July 30, 1998). 
72. In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
73. 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
74. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1298. 
75. Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
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distinction with regard to the matter at hand between in-house counsel 
and counsel sought from Merchant & Gould—communication between 
both was waived.76
In determining the scope of the privilege waiver, the court 
acknowledged the fears raised by the plaintiff in XYZ Corporation:77  
the use of privilege as both “a sword and a shield” disclosing only 
favorable communication but withholding unfavorable communication.  
To prevent such an abuse, the court ruled that waiver includes “all such 
communications regarding the same subject matter.”78
Next, in ruling on work product immunity waiver, the court noted 
the blurred distinction between factual and opinion work product and 
asserted that the district court should “balance the policies to prevent 
sword-and-shield litigation tactics with the policy to protect work 
product.”79
The court also enumerated a non-exhaustive list of three potentially 
relevant categories of work product:
(1) documents that embody a communication between the 
attorney and client concerning the subject matter of the case, 
such as a traditional opinion letter; (2) documents analyzing the 
law, facts, trial strategy, and so forth that reflect the attorney’s 
mental impressions but were not given to the client; and (3) 
documents that discuss a communication between attorney and 
client concerning the subject matter of the case but are not 
themselves communications to or from the client.80
As to the first category, the court found that generally all courts 
agreed,81 but that there was dissention within the district courts as to the 
next two categories of work product.82  To repair the inconsistencies, the 
court decided definitively that waiver would include the third category 
but not the second, which may include some of the disputed Merchant 
& Gould documents, noting that 
[w]ork-product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court 
of the infringer’s state of mind.  Counsel’s opinion is not 
important for its legal correctness.  It is important to the inquiry 
“whether it is thorough enough, as combined with other factors, 
76. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1304-05. 
77. XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003). 
78. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1301. 
79. Id. at 1302. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. at 1302-03. 
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to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably 
hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.”83
 The court also resolved the temporal issue with regard to waiver, 
once again quoting Akeva: “once a party asserts the defense of advice of 
counsel, this opens to inspection the advice received during the entire 
course of the alleged infringement,” including privileged information 
relayed during trial.84
Although EchoStar never mentioned the issue of waiver of trial 
counsel’s privilege and immunity, it mentions, albeit in dicta and in a 
footnote, Akeva, in a favorable light.85  The citation points to a very 
broad interpretation of waiver: 
[B]ecause infringement is a continuing activity, the requirement 
to exercise due care and seek and receive advice is a continuing 
duty.  Therefore, once a party asserts the defense of advice of 
counsel, this opens to inspection the advice received during the 
entire course of the alleged infringement.  Consequently, the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection 
covers all points of time, including up through trial.  The waiver 
also is not limited to the advice given by opinion counsel.  Since 
the waiver encompasses the subject matter of advice, that means 
that all opinions received by the client must be revealed, even 
those opinions the client receives from attorneys other than opinion 
counsel.86
This favorable mention has led to some confusion regarding the 
exact nature of the EchoStar opinion, particularly as to whether waiver 
extends even to trial counsel.87
83. Id. at 1303 (emphasis in the original). 
84. Id. at 1302 n.4 (quoting Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 
(M.D.N.C. 2003)). 
85. Id.  In summarizing his comments in Akeva, Judge Eliason cabins the opinion 
somewhat, noting that 
the broad waiver rule requiring full disclosure of documents, even if they were not 
given to the client, is best suited to the situation where the opinion counsel is [also] 
trial counsel . . . . [where] there is a greater need to make sure the opinion is not 
tainted by bias or other influences.  And, counsel’s uncommunicated thoughts and 
information may also be relevant in determining the competency of the opinion. . . . 
To the extent that a broader waiver of work product protection might also disclose 
the trial attorney has been orchestrating a sham opinion with opinion counsel, the 
Court finds that possibility to be sufficiently remote and more difficult to 
orchestrate.  Therefore, when the opinion counsel is independent, and should 
nothing else appear, the broader waiver of work product need not be employed. 
Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
86. Id. at 423 (emphasis added). 
87. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., No. O2 CIV. 2748, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
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EchoStar not only failed in its attempt to resolve the issue, but it and 
its progeny have further added to the confusion.88  Unfortunately, while 
a full examination of the twenty-odd subsequent cases is beyond the 
limitations of this Comment, it is worth noting that in EchoStar there 
are inconsistencies with regard to subject matter scope, temporal scope, 
and, most relevant to this discussion, the inclusion of trial counsel within 
the waiver.89  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit has refused to rehear the 
LEXIS 77077, at **12-13 (E.D.N.Y. October 20, 2006).  Note, however, that the discussion in 
Akeva, referenced by many cases, discusses only privilege and not work product immunity. 
88. “[P]redictably, the courts that have reviewed this issue post-EchoStar are split.”  
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., No. 03C2695, 2006 WL 3486810, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 1, 2006).
89. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77077, at *13.  The court noted 
that although EchoStar did not involve issues relating to waiver of trial counsel immunity and 
privilege, EchoStar cites favorably to Akeva: 
The supporting citation to Akeva . . . indicates to this Court that the Federal Circuit 
would extend the waiver to all attorneys who provided advice, including, in the case 
of ongoing infringement, trial counsel.  Excluding trial counsel from the scope of the 
waiver would permit a party to use the attorney-client privilege as both a sword and 
shield by allowing a party to choose which opinions are disclosed and which are not. 
Id.  See also Affinion Net Patents, Inc. v. Maritz, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356-57 (D. Del. 
2006) (noting that its interpretation of EchoStar would include waiver of both trial counsel 
and opinion counsel’s privilege with regard to willful infringement).  As opposed to other 
cases, the Affinion court does not need to make reference to Akeva to support this reading; it 
simply states that EchoStar is to be understood as waiver of communications with all counsel 
and with regard to any particular defense of infringement.  See id. at 357.  See also Ampex 
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 04-1373-KAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48702, at **7-9 (D. 
Del. July 17, 2006) (finding that EchoStar dealt primarily with issues relating to work product 
immunity, that it only dealt with privilege broadly and reasserted general principles, and that 
EchoStar ought to be limited only to the particular facts of the case); In re Target Tech. Co., 
Misc. Docket No. 827, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26240, at **4-5 (Fed. Cir. October 12, 2006) 
(although basing its ruling on Ninth Circuit law, the court found that even extrajudicial 
disclosures relating to an opinion letter constitute a waiver); Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team 
Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46, 50-51 (D.D.C. 2006) (extending the coverage of subject 
matter to issues beyond the actual communication at issue and ruling that “Intex has waived 
the attorney-client and work product privileges ‘for any document or opinion that embodies 
or discusses a communication to or from it concerning whether patent ‘469 is valid, 
enforceable, and infringed,’” but also finding any issue relating to the temporal nature of the 
waiver to be limited to the particular facts of EchoStar and not applicable) (citations 
omitted); Outside the Box Innovations, L.L.C. v. Travel Caddy, Inc. 455 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 
1379 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (ruling that there was a waiver of “[a]ll documents that reflect 
communications . . . that relate to the scope, validity, infringement, and/or enforceability of 
the ‘992 and ‘104 patents, including any and all attorney notes, summaries, documents and 
drafts of documents related to the same subject matters and that embody or discuss a 
communication” and “[a]ny document or opinion that embodies or discusses a 
communication . . .  [regarding whether the patent is] valid, enforceable, and infringed . . . 
regardless of the counsel involved, and regardless of the date”) (emphasis added); Ind. Mills 
& Mfg., Inc. v. Dorel Indus., Inc., No. 1:04-CV-01102-LJM-WTL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34023, at *19 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2006) (reading EchoStar to mean that the temporal scope of 
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case en banc,90 thus leaving it to district-level judiciary and possibly 
extra-judiciary methods to help litigants in this area of law.  The Federal 
Circuit’s seeming initial complacency with regard to these uncertainties 
seemed to be in direct opposition to the policies stated by the Supreme 
Court.91  The Federal Circuit’s contentment with its Echostar soon 
dissolved, and it quickly agreed to take up In re Seagate en banc to try 
again to sort out the issues. 
VI.  IN RE SEAGATE 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Convolve Inc. sued 
Seagate in the summer of 2000, asserting willful infringement of two 
patents.92  In response, Seagate obtained, over the span of a number of 
years, three written opinions from its counsel, Gerald Sekimura.  Each 
of the letters concluded that many of Convolve’s patent claims were 
invalid, that the patents were possibly unenforceable, and that Seagate 
did not infringe.93  Although the parties did not dispute the independent 
nature of the opinion counsel as distinct from the trial counsel, 
the waiver does not always extend post filing of the litigation and that the subject matter 
waiver is limited to the subject matter of the waived opinion letter); Beck Sys., Inc. v. 
Managesoft Corp., No. 05C2036, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53963, at **16-17 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 
2006) (extending waiver of privilege and immunity to trial counsel, but limiting the subject 
matter narrowly to the discussion in the opinion letter); Autobytel, Inc. v. Dealix Corp., 455 
F. Supp. 2d 569, 575 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that the court was “not persuaded that 
EchoStar mandates waiver as to unenforceability, validity, and non-infringement when an 
advice-of-counsel defense of non-infringement only is asserted.”); Abbott Labs. v. Andrx 
Pharms., Inc., No. 05C1490, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55647, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2006) 
(reading EchoStar to not endorse an automatic waiver of work product immunity following a 
waiver of attorney-client privilege); Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., 
No. C02-3378 JSW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58976, at **5-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006) (reading 
EchoStar’s support of Akeva to infer a waiver of trial counsel privilege as well following the 
disclosure of an opinion letter); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that a statement by trial counsel stating that it had not commented 
on a likelihood of success regarding invalidity or infringement would not be credible, and 
therefore a waiver by the defendant on an opinion letter would almost always also waive trial 
counsel privilege); CCC Info. Services, 2006 WL 3486810, at **4-6 (understanding EchoStar 
to limit the waiver of privilege to only the particular subject matter, including allowing for the 
redaction of related text in the opinion letter).
90. Certiorari was also denied by the Supreme Court, although in that instance, TiVo 
was asking the Court to narrow the Federal Circuit’s per se rule against disclosure of 
undisclosed attorney mental impressions.  TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'n Corp., 127 S. Ct. 
846 (2006). 
91. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). 
92.  This was later changed to three patents in an amended complaint in January of 
2002.   In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
93. Id. at 1366. 
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Convolve attempted to get privilege and immunity waived for trial 
counsel as well:  Convolve asserted that Seagate waived its attorney 
client privilege through notifying of its intent to rely on the three letters 
and moved for discovery of communications and work product of 
Seagate’s trial counsel.94  The trial court concluded in favor of Convolve:  
Seagate had waived privilege and work product immunity with any and 
all counsel with regard to infringement invalidity and enforceability 
opinions from the time that Seagate first learned of the patents and 
through the course trial.95
In response to Seagate’s writ of mandamus, the Federal Circuit took 
up the case en banc.  There was universal anticipation that the court 
would thoroughly deal with the issue and finally get it right sorting out 
the mess twenty-five years in the making. 
In its decision, released August 20, 2007, the court overruled 
Underwater Devices, and attempted to “clarify the scope of the waiver 
of attorney-client privilege and work product protection that results 
when an accused patent infringer asserts an advice of counsel defense to 
a charge of willful infringement.”96
In rejecting Underwater Devices,97 the court eliminated the 
affirmative duty of care to determine whether one was infringing 
another’s patent rights, i.e., “inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain 
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible 
infringing activity,”98 and reemphasized that there is no affirmative 
obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.  In doing away with this duty, 
the court justified its discarding of its earlier decision, noting that the 
duty was created at a time when there was “widespread disregard of 
patent rights [that] was undermining the national innovation 
incentive.”99  This fear, having now been assuaged to the court’s 
satisfaction, allowed it to overrule a now outdated ruling. 
The court also reassessed the threshold requirement for finding 
94.  Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Comp. Corp., 224 F.R.D. 98, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
95.  Id. at 110. 
96.   Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1365. 
97.  Underwater Devices’ position regarding an affirmative duty of care, and the 
necessity of seeking out advice of counsel itself, was arguably not supported by the case law it 
itself cited.  Simon Frankel and Deanna Kwong, Willful Infringement and Privilege After In re 
Seagate, Address before SFIPLA (Nov. 16, 2007). 
98.   Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368-69 (citation omitted). 
99. Id. (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 
F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing Advisory Committee on Industrial 
Innovation Final Report, Dep't of Commerce (Sep. 1979))). 
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willful infringement.  Underwater Devices had created a relatively low 
threshold similar to a negligence standard.100  In Seagate, the Federal 
Circuit, in finding this standard inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, created a new two part standard:  (i) an objective 
recklessness inquiry that shifted the burden of proof of willful 
infringement to the patentee.  To surmount this threshold, a patentee 
has to first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the putative 
infringer continued her actions despite the objectively high likelihood 
that her actions constituted infringement, and (ii) a subjective standard 
that this risk of infringement was known, or should have been known to 
the defendant.101
While this ruling would seem to provide potential infringers with 
much needed relief, it is still unclear how a jury might nevertheless see a 
defendant who in the face of a potential infringement did not seek an 
attorney’s opinion on infringement; or, if it did, still refused to show it to 
the court. 
The decision may have shifted the balance of power too 
overwhelmingly  in favor of defendants who might now be able to seek a 
declaratory judgment, in a favorable jurisdiction, in response to the 
extensive notice of infringement that is required by the Seagate decision 
to set off a charge of willful infringement. 
Of additional interest to litigators is the potential for the automatic 
tying of the now high threshold for finding willfulness with the 
determination that the case is exceptional enough to award attorney 
fees.102  If the patentee can overcome the high threshold to show an 
objective and subjective willful infringement by the defendant, courts 
might rightly, or wrongly, assume that attorney’s fees are also in order. 
Note however that the entire discussion regarding willfulness may 
soon become moot, and begs the question as to why the Federal Circuit 
chose, sua sponte, to address the issue of willfulness.  Current patent 
legislation in Congress attempts to deal directly with the issue of 
willfulness in patent litigation, and according to some consumer 
advocacy groups, does a better job at cabining the definition of 
willfulness than the Seagate court.103
100. Id. at 1371.
101.  Id.
102.  See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
103. See, e.g., Press Release:  Consumer Groups Ask Senate to Take Up Patent Bill 
(Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1258 (suggesting that 
further clarity is still required “to reduce the pressure on defendants to license patents of 
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Section 5(c) of the Patent Reform Act of 2007, in describing 
instances where willful infringement may not be found, notes, as the 
first example, the reasonable reliance on advice of counsel.104  This 
legislation would seem to  reinstate the opinion letter to its former level 
of importance in determining willfulness, irrespective of the current 
decision of the court.  Further, the legislation, which notably was passed 
subsequent to the Seagate decision, does not include a subjective 
component to the willfulness test.  Instead it requires only that the 
alleged infringer receive  
written notice from the patentee—(i) alleging acts of 
infringement in a manner sufficient to give the infringer an 
objectively reasonable apprehension of suit on such patent, and 
(ii) identifying with particularity each claim of the patent, each 
product or process that the patent owner alleges infringes the 
patent, and the relationship of such product or process to such 
claim, the infringer, after a reasonable opportunity to investigate, 
thereafter performed one or more of the alleged acts of 
infringement;105
The proposed legislation further implies the potential necessity for a 
separate trial to deal explicitly with willfulness.  Note that the usage of a 
separate proceeding may in and of itself limit the damage caused by the 
waiver of privilege and immunity, further diminishing the court’s 
decision.106
Patent reform though does not cover all of the decisions made in 
Seagate, particularly, how to decide the extent of counsel’s waiver. 
In dealing with waiver of trial counsel privilege and work product 
immunity, Seagate set out to definitively state that the production of an 
opinion counsel’s letter in response to a charge of willful infringement 
will not waive attorney client privilege for related communications with 
trial counsel.107  Further, the court found that the temporal bounds of 
any waiver would extend only up and to, but not including litigation; 
questionable quality.”).  Note, many expect the legislation to pass this year:  The Intellectual 
Property Owners Association believes that the patent reform initiative “is very much alive.  
Despite substantial opposition in the Senate, most observers believe Judiciary Chairman 
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) will attempt to pass the bill in the Senate this year or early next year 
with substantial amendments.” Stakeholders Lobby on Patent Reform; Senate Bill Viewed as 
'Alive,' but Stalled, 75 PAT., TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. 58 (Nov. 16, 2007). 
104. H. Res. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(3)(B)(i) (as passed by House of 
Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007). 
105.  Id. § 5(b)(2). 
106.  See id. at § 5(b)(3)(C)(4). 
107.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374. 
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opinions obtained after the filing of a complaint of infringement will 
have limited probative value to the determination of willful 
infringement.108  The plaintiff’s high bar to proving willfulness includes 
the fact that willfulness must be objectively provable prior to claiming it.  
As such, only actions up to the filing of a claim are relevant.109
In terms of work product immunity, the court, in light of its new 
willfulness standard concluded  
“that the significantly different functions of trial counsel and 
opinion counsel advise against extending waiver to trial counsel.  
Whereas opinion counsel serves to provide an objective 
assessment for making informed business decisions, trial counsel 
focuses on litigation strategy and evaluates the most successful 
manner of presenting a case to a judicial decision maker.  And 
trial counsel is engaged in an adversarial process.”110
Thus, the court emphatically stated that 
the same rationale generally limiting waiver of the attorney-
client privilege with trial counsel applies with even greater force 
to so limiting work product waiver because of the nature of the 
work product doctrine.  Protecting lawyers from broad subject 
matter of work product disclosure “strengthens the adversary 
process, and . . . may ultimately and ideally further the search for 
the truth.”  In addition, trial counsel's mental processes . . . enjoy 
the utmost protection from disclosure; a scope of waiver 
commensurate with the nature of such heightened protection is 
appropriate.111
Adding to its pro-defendant stance, the court, citing the Third 
Circuit’s In re Cendant Corp.,112 extended the work product doctrine 
beyond “‘documents and tangible things’ . . . . to ‘nontangible’ work 
product” as well.113  
Still, the court left open, somewhat cryptically, the possibility that 
trial counsel’s work product immunity and privilege could be waived 
under some circumstances:  “trial courts remain free to exercise their 
discretion in unique circumstances to extend waiver to trial counsel, 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. at 1373. 
111.  Id. at 1375-76 (citations omitted). 
112.  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003). 
113.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376.  “We agree that work product protection remains 
available to ‘nontangible’ work product under Hickman.  Otherwise, attorneys’ files would be 
protected from discovery, but attorneys themselves would have no work product objection to 
depositions.”  Id. 
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such as if a party or counsel engages in chicanery.”114
The Federal Circuit does not have any significant history in defining 
chicanery, mentioning it only three other times in its entire quarter 
century of rulings;115 two of those three references refer to the linguistic 
chicanery of the patent prosecutor–this level of chicanery–suggestive 
more of “word play” than outright deceit, does not seem to rise to the 
chicanery typically defined as subterfuge, fraud, or misrepresentation.116  
With such a low bar, it seems likely that many cases will rise to the 
Federal Circuit’s level of chicanery.  Moreover, chicanery is only one of 
the instances that will result in waiver; the court left it to trial courts to 
decide what other instances will allow for the waiver of privilege and 
immunity. 
Of further concern is the fact that while attorney-client privilege is 
for the client to waive, the court suggests that the attorney’s conduct 
alone—i.e., chicanery—could waive this right of the client.117
Of additional interest, and not addressed by the court, is the status 
114.  Id. at 1374-75.  Note the court also states that work product immunity is not 
waived, “absent exceptional circumstances.”  Id. at 1375.  Like chicanery, the court is not 
clear as to what arises to an exceptional circumstance except with regard to deciding whether 
to adhere to a decision in a prior appeal.  See, e.g., Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & 
Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing precedent showing that a court generally 
adheres to a decision in a prior appeal in the case unless one of three “exceptional 
circumstances” exists:  “the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, 
controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, 
or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”). 
115.  DeMarini Sports v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Vehicular 
Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Egan v. Dep't of 
Navy, 802 F.2d 1563, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
116.  Other areas of law may shine some light into whether courts discriminate as to the 
level of chicanery:  “A statement containing a half-truth may be as misleading as a statement 
wholly false.  Thus, a statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference 
to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 529a (2007).  Contrast this relatively low threshold 
for misleading the court in a tort situation with a significantly higher threshold for falsehood 
with regard to perjury:  “the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute 
invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner—so long as the 
witness speaks the literal truth.  The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to 
the specific object of the questioner's inquiry.”  Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360 
(1973) (not finding perjury when Mr. Bronston did not answer a question:  “Q. Do you have 
any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?  A. No, sir.  Q. Have you ever?  A. The 
company had an account there for about six months, in Zürich.”  It was later determined that 
Mr. Bronston did have accounts in Switzerland.  Id. at 354).  Later courts have refused to 
overrule or close up this perjury loophole.  
117.  The case law on inadvertent waiver may be relevant here.  In Underwater Storage 
the court ruled that the inadvertence of counsel would be imputed to the client.  Underwater 
Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970). 
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and definition of in-house counsel in relation to trial or opinion 
counsel:118  What if any is the scope of protection for in-house counsel’s 
work product?  Is in-house counsel’s investigation of infringement 
sufficient to overcome a charge of willful infringement by a patentee?  It 
will also be interesting to see how future courts, in following the Seagate 
decision deal with instances where trial counsel and opinion counsel are 
the same, or work within the same firm—often necessary, either to 
reduce overall attorney fees or to get a comprehensive and cohesive 
understanding of the technology and the eventual litigation. 
Also left unresolved is the issue of the continued use and necessity 
of opinion letters.  It remains unclear as to when an accused infringer 
may want to obtain an opinion letter.  For instance, it would probably 
behoove a defendant to obtain a letter in an instance where the 
infringing product closely resembles the plaintiff’s patent.  In particular, 
what role, if any, will an opinion letter play in the determination of 
recklessness—the new objective standard. 
Fortunately, none of these issues have been brought up in the 
handful of cases following Seagate, although they will eventually need to 
be dealt with. 
Seagate’s solution is too broad:  it wholly eliminates any affirmative 
duty of care on the part of the putative infringer.  Here, the Federal 
Circuit lost its chance to adjust or modulate the burden—allowing it to 
be easily reinstated when necessary—and instead has chosen to dismiss 
it entirely.  Nonetheless, without this affirmative duty there is arguably 
little need to get an opinion letter, and without an opinion letter there is 
no fear that an over-zealous court will ravage trial counsel’s privileges 
and immunities. 
But, in contradistinction to this position, it would seem that an 
affirmative duty is all the more relevant today.  With the concept of 
mutually assured destruction—i.e. building up enormous patent 
portfolios with the understanding that a patentee plaintiff would be 
crazy to assert her patent because the defendant could easily turn 
around and assert his own patent portfolio—driving much of hi-tech and 
biotech patenting strategies,119 determining whether one actually 
infringes a patent in a competitor (or non-competitor’s) portfolio is non-
118.  Seagate 497 F.3d at 1366 n.2 (“We do not address the trial court's discovery orders 
pertaining to Seagate's in-house counsel.”). 
119.  Chris Oakes, Patently Absurd,  WIRED (Ma. 3, 2000).  See also Lee Hudson 
Teslik, Patching up the Patent System (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/ 
publication/12948/patching_up_the_patent_system.html. 
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trivial and potentially a prohibitive one for small start-ups.  Until 
Seagate the potential threat of willful infringement—particularly for a 
startup—may have been enough incentive to design around the 
threatening patent, thereby innovating and further benefiting society.  
But now, without an affirmative duty to determine whether one is 
infringing, there is a perverse incentive to return to the pre-Federal 
Circuit days and begin ignoring patents anew.  Moreover, with the new 
heightened standard of willful infringement, a concomitant lesser 
chance of paying treble damages and attorney’s fees, there is a further 
disincentive to avoid infringing patents, even for the larger companies. 
It would seem unlikely that the patent system can thrive without 
some sort of affirmative duty here.  Given that the court could have 
adjusted the duty instead of throwing it out, its actions again seem rash 
and irresponsible. 
Notwithstanding this ruling, trial courts will most likely find some 
backdoor duty.  And opinion letters, because of an actual or threatened 
resurfacing of affirmative duty, will come back into vogue and new 
waiver issues will arise—particularly with regard to in-house counsel. 
Seagate actually comes off as an ill-timed scramble to rectify too 
many self-created problems with seemingly simplistic solutions.  
Willfulness was being dealt with by legislation120—now there may be 
competing rules for dealing with this subject.  Moreover, given the new 
standards devised by the courts, patentees will have to send out 
relatively expansive cease and desist letters that will allow an infringer 
the opportunity to seek out a declaratory judgment in a favorable 
jurisdiction—creating a strong disincentive to send out such letters in 
the first place and resulting in lesser incentives on the patent infringer to 
innovate and design around the infringed patent, leading to a 
discrediting  of the patent system and right back where the Federal 
Circuit started twenty-five years ago with Underwater Devices.121
Further, this decision would suggest that patent holders would do 
well to seek out preliminary injunctions against infringers to maintain 
their ability to claim willful infringement.122  Unfortunately for the 
120.  See supra text accompanying notes 103-106. 
121.  This concern is further enhanced by the following recent ruling:  SanDisk Corp. v. 
STMicroelectronics, Inc. 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  Note that this decision is also an 
example of the Federal Circuit swinging too broadly, this time in response to a Supreme 
Court footnote from MedImmune v. Genentech,127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
122.  Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374 (citation omitted).  The court stated that a  
patentee can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an 
adequate remedy for combating post-filing willful infringement.  A patentee who 
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patent holder, post eBay, it may be more difficult to obtain such an 
injunction.123
Succinctly Seagate hasn’t accomplished much.  Throwing out the 
longstanding affirmative duty of care could lead to a devaluation of 
patents and too big a shift by the Federal Circuit in favor of 
defendants.124  Opinion letters, it seems, may continue to be important 
and valued, at least by juries, and the waiver issue remains open, not 
only in instances of chicanery and exceptional circumstances, but with 
regard to in-house counsel, and firms that serve as both opinion and 
trial counsel.125
Perhaps these seemingly irrational actions by the Federal Circuit can 
be better understood through the lens of public choice theory.126
Public choice theory, an economic theory developed by Nobel 
Prize laureate James Buchanan, looks to economic principles that 
dictate an individual’s actions in the market, such as utility and self-
interest.  These principles are then applied to larger government groups 
replacing “romantic and illusory . . . notions about the workings of 
governments [with] . . . notions that embody more skepticism."127  Thus, 
with voters often choosing to ignore most issues, politicians are free to 
does not attempt to stop an accused infringer's activities in this manner should not 
be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on the infringer's post-filing 
conduct. Similarly, if a patentee attempts to secure injunctive relief but fails, it is 
likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness. 
Id. 
123 Ebay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).  Although eBay 
dealt with permanent injunctions which requires the determination of actual success in 
litigation versus a reasonable likelihood of success for a preliminary injunction, both 
preliminary and permanent injunctions are based on the same statutory authority emanating 
from 35 U.S.C. § 283.  See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
80443, at **345-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
124.  Note however that this may balance out in some jurisdictions where there is an 
obvious bias in favor of the patentee, such as the International Trade Commission or 
Marshall Texas.  See Robert W. Hahn, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases:  A Review 
of International Trade Commission Decisions 15 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Reg. 
Studies Working Paper No. RP07-03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=950583. 
125  This might be particularly relevant to small startups that may not be able to afford 
multiple teams of attorneys. 
126.  See Dov Greenbaum, An Analysis of the Evolution of the Written Description 
Requirement vis-à-vis DNA and Biotechnological Inventions, 1 RECENT PATS ON DNA & 
GENE SEQUENCES 138 (2007). 
127. Jane S. Shaw, Public Choice Theory, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/PublicChoiceTheory.html (citing James 
Buchanan) (last visited Dec. 26, 2007). 
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act in ways that are costly to individual citizens; e.g., by logrolling.128  
Although judiciaries would seemingly lack the same incentives 
that politicians have to listen to public interest groups, they nonetheless 
also tend to be captured by the interests of lobbyists.  Public choice 
explains this seeming inconsistency by noting that even judiciaries are 
strongly inclined to act in the best interests of their stated mission to 
remain within Congress’s favor and retain accesses to funding.  This 
reliance on a congressionally prescribed mission makes the judiciary and 
agencies appear to be captured to the lobbyists and industries as well.129
In the case of the Federal Circuit, it sees its mission as 
“promoting technological progress by enlarging patent rights” in the 
interests of the patent holders; and,  according to Landes and Posner, 
this mission-oriented specialized court is “a consequence largely of 
interest-group politics.”130
Without real knowledge of the actual mindsets of the Federal 
Circuit justices we can only speculate as to their motivations.  
Nevertheless, applying public choice theory, particularly in the context 
of other recent decisions, we can make some educated guesses.  In 
Seagate and other current cases, this Comment suggests that the court 
was responding to concerns from the hi-tech sector in particular. 
Patent trolls, a term coined by Peter Detkin of Intel, typically refers 
to a person or corporation that while owning intellectual property does 
not manufacture anything but rather finds revenue in either licensing its 
IP or asserting its patents through litigation:131  “[S]omeone who makes 
money by extorting a license from the manufacturer who allegedly has 
infringed the patent.  Fearing the possibility of an injunction will force 
the manufacture to cease operations, the company settles.”132
Patent trolls are seen as a menace, particularly by the high tech 
industry—filing lawsuits without warning, seeking license fees, and 
threatening injunctions.  And, consistently, these lawsuits plead willful 
infringement on the part of the defendant.  Given the often centrality of 
128.  Id. 
129.  Leon Felkins, Introduction to Public Choice, http://perspicuity.net/sd/pub-
choice.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2007). 
130. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 26-27, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_ 
Landes.pdf.  
131  See, generally, Patent Trolls:  Fact Or Fiction?:  Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, And Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). 
132  Id. at 1. 
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the purportedly infringed intellectual property to the defendant’s 
business, the defendant will most likely continue to ‘infringe’ 
throughout the case.  With the significant expenses involved in 
litigation, many defendants would rather settle.133
Seagate, it would seem, as well as other recent cases, would reflect 
the Federal Circuit’s directed response to patent trolls, particularly in 
response to concerns from the hi-tech sector.  The biotech sector—with 
relatively fewer patents in their portfolios and with generic competitors 
that often do actually willfully infringe—may see less of a benefit 
coming out of the Seagate decision.134
Over the last couple of decades technology companies have been 
amassing large arsenals of patents, not generally to assert against their 
competitors, but rather as a defensive tool in an ongoing game of 
brinkmanship:  no large company would dare assert a patent against 
their competitor, as that competitor could easily find a patent in their 
own portfolio that they use in a return salvo on the plaintiff.  This 
situation was often compared to the mutually assured destruction 
scenario of the Cold War.135
In recent years Patent Trolls, principally in the hi-tech industry, have 
upset this delicate balance; in 2007 alone, trolls have been primarily 
responsible for the projected thirty percent increase in litigants sued for 
patent infringement.136  Buying up large patent portfolios and asserting 
them against large and wealthy corporations, these tolls have made a 
business model out of threats of expensive litigation.  The mutually 
assured destruction model of yore will not work against these guerilla 
tactics; without a manufacturing base, trolls have little to lose by threats 
of counter attacks from their opponents. 
133  Id. at 21 (statement of Paul Misener).  The “multi-million dollar barrier to even 
challenge patent validity or infringement (and then only to a jury that is unlikely to 
understand the technology) provides huge troll shakedown-settlement opportunities by 
contingent fee tort lawyers which are rapidly being increasingly exploited.”  Posting of Paul 
Morgan, Guest Commentary on Why Patent Reform Needed to Patent Troll Tracker 
http://trolltracker.blogspot.com/2007_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 28. 2007). 
134.  See Jeremiah S. Helm, Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent 
Trolls: The Disparate Impact of Ebay v. Mercexchange on Innovation 13 MICH. TELECOMM. 
TECH. L. REV. 331, 338-43 (2006), for a theory as to why biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies support patent trolls. 
135  See supra text accompanying note 119.  See also Col. Alan J. Parrington, USAF, 
Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited Strategic Doctrine in Question, AIRPOWER J Winter 
1997), at 4, 6. 
136.   Posting A Call for the Senate to Pass Patent Reform to Patent Troll Tracker 
http://trolltracker.blogspot.com/2007_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 9, 2007). 
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Seagate can be seen as an effort to fix many of the problems 
encountered in these instances by the high tech companies. 
The setting of a high objective bar to finding an instance of willful 
infringement can be seen as a direct attack on trolls.  A finding of willful 
infringement and the concomitant treble damages is part of what makes 
patent litigation so rewarding and enticing to trolls.  The bar now makes 
it more expensive for a troll to assert willful infringement, requiring 
actual proof of willfulness prior to making the claim, and it makes it less 
likely that an unsuspecting non-malicious defendant will be found to 
have objectively willfully infringed.137
Further, throwing out the duty of affirmative care makes it much 
easier for large corporations to exist in the face of a vast and virtually 
unknowable array of patents and submarine patents that could be 
asserted against them at anytime.  Note that the loss of the affirmative 
duty of care would probably not affect the epic battles between massive 
patent portfolios that essentially ignored the duty of care from the 
outset, replacing it with assurances that “no matter what you assert 
against me, I can assert something against you.” 
Until Seagate, companies would be held liable for willful 
infringement if they kept up infringing production during the case.  
Seagate negates this by ruling that the basis for willful infringement must 
occur prior to litigation; corporations are safe to continue production 
without fear of increased damages.138
Seagate, by limiting the instances where waiver would occur as a 
result of an opinion letter—the first and cheapest line of defense against 
a threatening troll—limits the ability of trolls, who may not have the 
best counsel, to unfairly garnish information from defendant’s 
counsel.139  Further, the risk and costs of additional litigation dealing 
with the extant and scope of the waiver, a perennial issue in many cases, 
could be used by the trolls as a further form of intimidation—forcing 
companies to settle rather than to go through protracted and potentially 
revealing litigation. 
Finally, limiting waiver instances mostly to where chicanery has 
occurred will further hamper a troll’s effort to intimidate.  An assertion 
of chicanery by a troll may be a dangerous move:  given the inherent 
hypocrisy in a troll raising the claim if chicanery, such a claim could 
raise the ire of the court. 
137.  See supra text accompanying note 103. 
138.  See supra text accompanying note 102. 
139.  See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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These assertions of a direct attack on trolls by the Federal Circuit 
are not founded on the Seagate decision alone.  More recent case law 
would also suggest this direction by the Federal Circuit.  On September 
20, 2007 the court issued two simultaneous rulings that reduced the 
scope of patentable inventions:  In re Comiskey140 and In re Nuijten141  
both try to cabin what can be patentable under the rubric of a  business 
method patent.  Business method patents have become a growing 
concern for those that are threatened by trolls.  “The PTO has issued 
thousands of [business method] patents . . . littering the business 
landscape with land mines for unsuspecting companies and their 
CIOs.”142
Patent trolls holding an inventory of business method patents 
pose a particular risk to modern day businesses. . . . [A]lmost any 
business is susceptible to an attack by a patent troll. 
Business method patents are also very difficult to invalidate 
based on what was known at the time of the patent application 
. . . . even for inventions that feel like they have been around 
forever, it may be very hard to find the proof needed to prove 
the patent invalid in court.143
The court in In re Comiskey, where the litigant tried to patent a 
method of arbitrating, limited the scope of business methods patents, 
noting that patents cannot “be issued on particular business systems—
such as a particular type of arbitration—that depend entirely on the use 
of mental processes. . . .  [T]he law does not allow patents on particular 
systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone.”144  
The court further ruled that the trivial association of the unpatentable 
140.  In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
141.  In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346 (2007). 
142.  Rob Garretson, Intellectual Security: Patent Everything You Do, Before Someone 
Else Does, at http://www.cioinsight.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=167502,00.asp (Dec. 5, 2005) 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2007). 
Congress can further reduce the power of the patent troll by enacting legislation to 
that effect. Some potential reforms that Congress may adopt in an effort to reduce 
the power of patent trolls include improving the review of business- method patents, 
weakening the presumption of validity for business- method patents, eliminating the 
submarine patent, and providing that a court consider the patent troll's actual 
contribution to the overall product or service when determining the extent of 
monetary or equitable relief. 
Damian Myers, Note, Reeling In The Patent Troll:  Was Ebay v. Mercexchange 
Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 348-49 (2007). 
143  Sarah Chapin Columbia & Stacy L. Blasberg, Beware Patent Trolls, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, Apr. 2006, at 22, 24. 
144.  In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at1378. 
  
186  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 12.1 
 
 
mental process with a machine will still not make the claim patentable.145
Similarly in In re Nuijten, where the claim was for a signal containing 
a watermark, the court further limited the scope of business method 
patents.146  “If a claim covers material not found in any of the four 
statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope 
of § 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful.”147
The details of the cases are beyond the scope of this Comment.  
Suffice it to say it seems like the court, following in the footsteps of 
Seagate’s attack on trolls on behalf of the high tech industry was further 
raining on the troll parade by reigning in the scope of patentable subject 
matter, particularly in the areas often frequented by patent trolls in their 
litigations against high technology companies.148
Without actual discussion with the Federal Circuit, it remains 
uncertain whether any of the above is the actual reasoning behind 
Seagate’s expansive and potentially unnecessary ruling.  In light of this, 
the final section of this Comment will look to alternatives that the 
Federal Circuit might have chosen and could still apply to deal with 
some of the aforementioned issues. 
VII.  POLICY OPTIONS 
As noted earlier, there may continue to be a need for opinion letters 
in patent litigation.  
The whole question should have been moot after Knorr Bremse.149  
Given the potential damage that waiver might cause, why would a 
defendant ever assert an opinion of counsel defense?  Unfortunately, 
statistics show that without an opinion of counsel defense, a defendant 
will more often than not be found to have willfully infringed.150  This 
145.  Id. at 1380.  Note that like Seagate, the court dealt with the issue of patentable 
subject matter sua sponte; it was not at issue either during the prosecution of the patent or on 
appeal. 
146.  In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348. 
147.  Id. at 1354. 
148  Note interestingly historical similarities to early instances of opportunistic patent 
litigation:  “In the nineteenth century, Congress eliminated this risk by wiping out the patents 
that were fueling opportunistic litigation.  This suggests that abolition may be the only 
solution for modern trolls, at least with respect to patents for business methods and 
software.”  Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries And Barnyards:  Patent Trolls And The Perils 
Of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1813 (2007).
149. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[An] adverse inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have 
been unfavorable . . . is no longer warranted.”). 
150. Moore, supra note 70, at 239. 
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may remain to be the case even after Seagate given the uncertainties 
introduced by juries who may become suspicious if an opinion of 
counsel is not produced at trial. 
Of greatest concern are the chilling effects on trial counsel’s 
interactions with the defendant when much of their privileged 
discussions could come to light during discovery.  Without a clear 
definition of what would amount to an exceptional circumstance, or 
even chicanery, there still exists a concern that a trial court will waive 
trial counsel’s privilege and immunity. 
It is unlikely that risk adverse corporations will, in response to 
Seagate, desist from obtaining opinion letters as absent a clearly 
erroneous decision, the Federal Circuit is unlikely to overrule a finding 
of willfulness by the trial courts.151  And, without a clearer definition of 
the newly created standards in Seagate, trial courts could potentially be 
all over the map in determining willfulness.  With this uncertainty, 
potential infringers may continue to look to trial counsel for their 
opinions—creating further instances where trial counsel may have their 
privileges and immunities waived. 
A.  Bifurcation of Trials 
The obvious choice for limiting the effects of waiver, and hinted to in 
the Seagate decision is the bifurcation of trials.152  This involves 
separating out the determination of willfulness after the court has 
determined that infringement has taken place, thus limiting any damage 
caused by waiver to the second, less important half of the case.153  Often 
this would also mean staying discovery of evidence related to 
willfulness.154  Practically, this does not seem to be a viable option.  Most 
151. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508,510 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“Whether infringement is willful is a question of fact, findings on which are reviewable under 
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.”).
152. See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed Cir. 1991) 
(suggesting that “[t]rial courts thus should give serious consideration to a separate trial on 
willfulness[,]” particularly when faced with issues of waiver).  Note, however, that while 
“[t]he decision to bifurcate a trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . [and 
that] bifurcation of trials is not unusual and may under appropriate circumstances be the 
preferred method, [nevertheless,] bifurcation remains the exception rather than the rule.” 
Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 02 CIV. 8917, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11382, at 
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004) (citation omitted). 
153. “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim . . 
. or of any separate issue . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
154. Courts have been even more unwilling to stay discovery.  See, e.g., Johns Hopkins 
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cases end up not being bifurcated,155 and (anecdotally) most motions for 
bifurcation are refused,156 possibly due to the perceived expense and 
time constraints involved in holding a second jury trial.157  It is unclear if 
this will change following Seagate. 
B.  Minimize the Offensive Use of Willfulness 
One way to deal with the waiver issue is to lessen the chance that 
Univ. v. CellPro, 160 F.R.D. 30, 36 (D. Del. 1995) 
It is understandable that those involved in patent litigation would want to minimize 
the risk of harm from this problem and would look to the Rules of Civil Procedure 
for possible solutions. . . . 
. . . [S]taying discovery on the advice of counsel defense and ordering a separate trial 
on willfulness or damages is not a particularly efficient or effective solution.  Staying 
discovery on communications relating to the advice of counsel until after liability 
has been established builds difficult delays and complications into the case. . . .  [I]t 
precludes the possibility of granting a summary judgment on the willfulness claim . . 
. .  It assumes that following a decision on liability and damages the court will need 
to suspend the trial and establish a new schedule under Rule 16 for completion of 
discovery on willfulness.  The court would then need to hold a second pretrial 
conference and enter a second pretrial order with an identification of documents to 
be offered into evidence and witnesses to be called to testify on the willfulness 
issues.  Thereafter, the court would recall the jury and hold a second trial. 
This stop-and-start of a stay of discovery and separate trials undermines our goal of 
working to apply the Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain a just, speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of every action.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.  It is not in the 
interests of justice to make these adjustments to our procedures for litigating cases 
to solve this problem. 
Id. 
155. See, e.g., Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F. 
Supp. 1429, 1434-35 (D. Del. 1989) (“[C]ourts are less likely to grant bifurcation when the 
issues to be decided are not particularly complex” and that “[t]he burden of showing a 
significant risk of confusion is on the party requesting bifurcation.”).  See also Calmar, Inc. v. 
Emson Research, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 861, 866 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (denying a motion for 
bifurcation, noting that “[b]ifurcation of the issue of willfulness and a stay of discovery would 
only complicate the instant proceedings and cause needless delay”). 
156. The anecdotal evidence implies that courts rarely bifurcate.  The reality actually 
demonstrates otherwise:  “The issue of willfulness was bifurcated in 48.6% of the bench trials 
and 21.7% of the jury trials” between 1999 and 2000.  Moore, supra note 70, at 235 (further 
noting that bifurcating a trial can also, counter intuitively, save time and money).  
Nevertheless, one reason that bifurcation is not as popular as it seems is that “when 
bifurcation is granted, it is bifurcation of the trials only, not bifurcation of discovery.”  Id. at 
236.  Thus, opposing counsel still retains access to potentially privileged discussion and 
documents throughout the trial. 
157. Note, however, that a jury trial is not required.  See John B. Pegram, The Willful 
Patent Infringement Dilemma and the 7th Amendment, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 
271, 272 (2004) (suggesting that the Seventh Amendment requirement for a jury trial does not 
apply to the determination of willful infringement once a determination of infringement has 
already occurred). 
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waiver will ever arise during trial by minimizing or removing the 
possibility of a willful infringement offense.  A claim of willful 
infringement is made in almost every patent suit,158 and as long as it is 
relatively risk free to do so, patentees will probably continue to make 
the claim. 
In addition to the potential chilling effects on innovation resulting 
from the current status of the law regarding willful infringement, there is 
also a growing concern that the possibility of collecting compensation 
for attorneys’ fees has inflated those fees.159  In fact many lawyers now 
consider willful infringement as the main cost component in a suit.160  
With the continued uncertainty of being found willfully infringing, 
businesses can never accurately determine whether it would be 
economically efficient to infringe, an unfortunate necessity.161
1.  Removing Willfulness 
The Federal Trade Commission noted that some scholars 
recommended abolishing the doctrine and recommended that it at least 
be reigned in.162  Similarly, the NAS Report also suggested that the 
doctrine be either abolished entirely or severely curtailed:163  “there has 
been no empirical demonstration that the availability of enhanced 
damages provides substantial additional deterrence over and above that 
associated with the usual costs and risks of defending an infringement 
claim.”164  Notwithstanding these opinions, there are valid concerns that 
the abolishment of the willful infringement doctrine will create perverse 
disincentives for infringers to take a license, or to license immediately, 
as opposed to licensing the patent only after one loses the lawsuit.165
158. Moore, supra note 70, at 232 (finding alleged willful infringement in 92.3% of 
approximately 1700 patent infringement lawsuits).  Moore reinforces the concern that 
infringement is claimed somewhat frivolously, noting that typically willful infringement is 
claimed in all the individual patents at issue in patent litigation.  Id. 
159. See, e.g., id. at 227 n.3 (noting an award of attorneys’ fees of $5,044,140.40 in 
Precor Inc. v. Life Fitness, an amount slightly less than the actual value of the infringement). 
160. NAS Report, supra note 54 (citing an AIPLA report at 123). 
161. Note that this may not be a bad thing.  The law never considers infringement to be 
good. 
162. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TO 
PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 242 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
163. NAS Report, supra note 54, at 7. 
164. Id. at 119. 
165. This position has been described as “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose.”  Panduit Corp. 
v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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Creating criminal liability for infringement, as is the case in other 
major patent offices, may minimize these incentives.166  Alternatively, a 
judge could decrease liability in cases where someone is merely 
negligent as opposed to willful.167  Note that this direction will also help 
repair a schism between patent law and the rest of American law168 by 
removing the ability of courts to find willfulness in even negligent 
infringement.169
2.  Disincentivizing the Usage of Willfulness 
Willfulness will probably continue to be asserted in patent 
infringement cases:  Limiting the type of infringers that could be found 
to be willfully infringing, or limiting the most egregious damage awards 
to actual pirates, and applying a lesser punishment to independent 
inventors of the infringing product, may limit the usage of willful 
infringement.170  Alternatively, Congress could legislate independent 
invention as an affirmative defense to infringement. 
While the independent invention defense has not gotten much 
traction in American patent law reform, it does exist in some other 
jurisdictions.171  Such a defense may help improve patent quality172 and 
166. See, e.g., Norio Komuro, Japan’s Patent Law Amendment on Remedies against 
Patent Infringement, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 263, 263 (1998); Patent Litigation in China, 
http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ForeignPatentLitigation/ChinaPR_Patent_Litigation.html 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2007). 
167. See, e.g., Germany. 
168.  Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana  Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1351 n.88 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (citation omitted). 
Patent law is not an island separated from the main body of American 
jurisprudence.  The same requirement of reprehensibility restricts an award of 
enhanced damages in patent cases as in other cases. When an infringer merely fails 
to exercise his supposed duty of care, there are none of the circumstances ordinarily 
associated with egregiously improper conduct that could be sufficiently 
reprehensible to warrant imposition of punitive damages. 
Id. 
169. See generally Stephanie Pall, Note, Willful Patent Infringement:  Theoretically 
Sound?  A Proposal To Restore Willful Infringement to its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 659 (2006). 
170. This is currently the case in other forms of intellectual property including 
copyright and trade secret.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The 
Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002).  In 
addition to lessening the usage of willfulness as an offense, the threat of entry to the market 
by an independent inventor would create an inducement for the patentee to license the 
technology, which, in turn, would lower the market price of the invention.  Id. 
171. Germany has such a defense called Vorbenutzungsrecht, although it carries 
somewhat limited rights. German Patent Act §12.1 See also Samson Vermont, Independent 
Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
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would also reduce the wasting of resources that occurs when firms run 
duplicate and parallel research and development operations in a patent 
race.173
While there are some problems with this defense,174 and the defense 
may be hard to prove, it could piggyback on the methods for 
determining the first to invent and in copyright where independent 
creation is a defense to infringement. 
3.  Disincentivizing Willful Infringement 
The threat of a permanent injunction against egregious, willful 
infringement would force many of the putative infringers to license 
rather than going to trial.175  However, the recent eBay ruling may limit 
the applicability of this option.176  After eBay, plaintiffs can no longer be 
certain that a court will grant a permanent injunction against an 
infringer, who, without the threat of a finding of willful infringement, 
may continue to infringe until a final court decision disallowing it. 
C.  Redefining the Privileged Nature of an Opinion Letter 
Defendants might think about asserting that the production of an 
opinion letter ought not be considered a waiver of privilege; it does not 
relate to the information that privilege is designed to protect.  The 
touchstone of the privilege is that of an expectation of confidentiality.177  
But as recent articles and cases have pointed out, the opinion letter is 
now a component of the business practice, even a game between 
172. Obvious inventions will not be patented since there may be many others who 
independently invented, and the potential for significant royalties from the initial obvious 
invention would thereby be limited.  See, e.g., Jackson Lenford, Right to Create, 
http://righttocreate.blogspot.com/2005/11/independent-invention-defense.html (Nov. 4, 2005 
11:22). 
173. See id. 
174. An obvious example is the drug development pipeline, where one inventor can go 
through hundreds of potential hits before arriving at the drug, while a second can 
serendipitously arrive at the drug much sooner. 
175. See Harold A. Borland, The Affirmative Duty To Exercise Due Care In Willful 
Patent Infringement Cases:  We Still Want It, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 175, 186-87 (2005). 
176. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (“The decision 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district 
courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of 
equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”). 
177. “It is vital to a claim of privilege that the communications between client and 
attorney were made in confidence and have been maintained in confidence.”  In re Horowitz, 
482 F.2d 72, 82 (2nd Cir. 1973) (requiring the court to be persuaded that documents are 
intended to remain confidential). 
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litigants;178 it is created and produced principally to show the adversarial 
party, if the patent was ever to be litigated, that infringement was not 
willful.179  To say that such a document, designed primarily to be used as 
an exhibit in trial and often not representing a legitimate opinion,180  
would destroy attorney-client privilege by its divulgence seems to be 
unjustifiable, unfair, and illogical.  Privilege never attached to the 
document,181 so how could it destroy privilege for privileged documents 
and discussion?182  Nevertheless, courts, focused on theoretical, rigid, 
178. See Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D. Del. 
2000) (explaining that there is a legitimate concern that 
patent attorneys [are encouraged] to deliberately omit damaging information from 
their opinion letters in order to insulate their clients from a finding of willful 
infringement.  Furthermore, because both attorney and client know why the advice 
of counsel is being sought, their relationship has the potential to be premised upon 
the understanding (whether explicit or implicit) that only favorable information 
should be disclosed. 
(emphasis added)).  Compare Geoffrey Shipsides, Advocacy or Counsel:  The Continuing 
Dual Role of Written Infringement Opinion Letters and the Failure of Knorr-Bremse to 
Confine the Role of Patent Attorneys Issuing Written Infringement Opinion Letters, 18 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1069, 1070 (2005) 
These infringement opinion letters ostensibly have the purpose of giving the 
potential infringer advice as to whether they are infringing the patent in question.  
The infringement opinion has the second potential use of being produced as 
evidence at trial of the potential infringer's state of mind for the determination of 
willful infringement.  Patent attorneys, aware of this possible evidentiary use of 
infringement opinion letters, know that the letter is also the place to advocate for 
their client's position of non-infringement. 
Id.  (emphasis added), with Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(the Federal Circuit expects from an opinion letter, requiring  that the “opinion must be 
thorough enough, as combined with other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a 
court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable.”).    See 
also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the “affirmative 
duty of due care that normally requires the potential infringer to obtain competent legal 
advice before infringing or continuing to infringe.  The emphasis here must be on competent 
legal advice. . . .  If infringers could rely on any opinion to defeat willful infringement, no 
matter how incompetent, insulation from increased damages would be complete”) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
179. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 53, at 1104 (“Opinions of counsel, in short, aren't 
unvarnished legal advice.  They exist for show.”). 
180. “[A]ccused infringers who are aware of these rules respond to such letters by 
obtaining a sort of pseudo-legal advice that both they and their attorneys recognize to be a 
construct.  Both plaintiffs and defendants are playing a costly game.”  Id. at 1087. 
181. “For the attorney-client privilege to attach to a communication, it must have been 
made in confidence and for the purpose of securing or conveying legal advice.  The privilege 
evaporates the moment that confidentiality ceases to exist.”  XYZ Corp. v. United States, 348 
F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
182. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “a party does not waive the attorney-
client privilege for documents which he is compelled to produce.”  Transamerica Computer 
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and absolute notions of fairness and the potential to use privilege as 
both a sword and shield, might not allow this claim.183
D.  Selective Waiver 
An alternative is the creation of a selective waiver doctrine for an 
opinion of counsel defense.184  Selective waiver is usually associated with 
disclosure of privileged documents and information to government 
agencies, e.g., waiver of information to the SEC does not waive 
privilege.185
The Eighth Circuit ruled in Diversified Industries Inc. v. Meredith186 
that “voluntary surrender of privileged material to a governmental 
agency in obedience to an agency subpoena [does not] constitute[ ] a 
waiver of the privilege for all purposes,”187 noting in particular a fear 
that interpreting such disclosure to be a waiver “may have the effect of 
thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ 
independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them.”188  While 
Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original).  Thus disclosure of the 
letter may not waive the rest of the privilege. 
183. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. 04-84-GFVT, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40612, at *20 (E.D. Ky. June 15, 2006) (noting that an opinion letter 
“was a privileged communication to SCC, irrespective of the fact that SCC is now trying to 
label the Blakey Letter as a non-privileged communication.  A rose by any other name smells 
the same.”).  Static Control can be distinguished, however, from the idea presented above:  in 
Static Control the defendant claimed the document was unprivileged as it was not prepared as 
an opinion letter.  I argue that even if it was prepared by an attorney as an opinion letter, it 
ought not to be perceived as privileged. 
184.  Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977).  While selective 
waiver seems to be generally disliked by many circuits, see, e.g. In re John Doe Corp., 675 
F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) and Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/Hca 
Healthcare Corp. (in Re Columbia/Hca Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 
289 (6th Cir. 2002).  Patent law does have its own inconsistent degree of selectiveness in 
applying waiver and loss of immunity.  Courts typically cabin the waiver in terms of time and 
subject matter. 
185. The case of selective waiver is somewhat confusing.  See, e.g., In re 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294-95 (6th Cir. 2002). 
[T]he case law addressing the issue of limited waiver is in a state of hopeless 
confusion.  Indeed, . . . some courts have even taken internally inconsistent opinions.  
A review of the positions presented by the various courts reveals three general 
opinions on the issue–selective waiver is permissible, selective waiver is not 
permissible under any situations, and selective waiver is permissible in situations 
where the Government agrees to a confidentiality order. 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
186. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
187. Id. at 604 n.1. 
188. Id. at 611. 
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most if not all other circuit courts have refused to recognize selective 
waiver,189 one could make the case for allowing it in this particular 
situation.190  Instead of framing the selectiveness of the waiver as only a 
waiver to a third party, perhaps the Federal Circuit can see this waiver 
as a very narrow subject matter waiver, that of only (but all) opinion 
letters referencing the opinion of counsel as to non-infringement.191
The Federal Circuit in discussing selective waiver noted that it “has 
never recognized such a limited waiver,”192 and other circuits are loathe 
to allow the tactical use of waiver, noting that because the incorporation 
of a waiver into the litigation process “inhibits the truth-finding process, 
it has been narrowly construed, and courts have been vigilant to prevent 
litigants from converting the privilege into a tool for selective 
disclosure.”193
Selective waiver should be all the more relevant in instances where 
there is the potential for waiver of the work product doctrine.  The 
District of Columbia Circuit in particular noted that 
the work product privilege does not exist to protect a 
confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary 
system by safeguarding the fruits of an attorney’s trial 
189. See, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(criticizing the Eighth Circuit for not giving this decision more than “a paragraph of 
analysis”).  See also In re Columbia Healthcare, 293 F.3d at 302 (where the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “reject[s] the concept of selective waiver, in any of its 
various forms”); Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Martin 
Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 
1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
190. See, e.g., Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Columbia/Hca Healthcare 
Corp. (in Re Columbia/Hca Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.), 293 F.3d 289, 295 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (acknowledging the split of opinions regarding selective waiver: “the case law 
addressing the issue of limited waiver is in a state of hopeless confusion. Indeed, some courts 
have even taken internally inconsistent opinions”).  
191. The disclosure of one opinion letter would force the waiver of all opinion letters, 
thus limiting the ability of the defendant to disclose only those opinions favorable to her 
position, but nevertheless preventing the disclosure of trial counsel privileged documents and 
discussions. 
192. Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1417. 
193. Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (citation omitted) (noting that the attorney-client 
privilege is not designed for such tactical employment).  See also the D.C. Circuit’s follow-up 
opinion, In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“A client 
cannot waive . . . [the] privilege in circumstances where disclosure might be beneficial while 
maintaining it in other circumstances where nondisclosure would be beneficial. . . .  [T]he 
attorney-client privilege should be available only at the traditional price:  a litigant who 
wishes to assert confidentiality must maintain genuine confidentiality.”) (citation omitted). 
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preparation from the discovery attempts of an opponent.  A 
disclosure made in the pursuit of such trial preparation, and not 
inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against opponents, should 
be allowed without waiver of the privilege.194
The courts’ acceptance of this selective waiver may hinge on how 
they view privilege.  Are privilege and immunity principally 
impediments to truth finding, or is their promotion of unfettered 
discussion between client and attorney of primary importance?  I would 
argue the latter.195  Additionally, and particularly in the present case, the 
calculus of the courts with regard to waiver—that waiver implies that 
the privilege incentive was never necessary—196would not apply; without 
producing an opinion of counsel letter, the litigant is likely to lose.197
CONCLUSION 
It’s all a game until someone gets hurt.  Given the true nature of 
willfulness as an offensive tactic, and of the opinion of counsel letter as a 
defense to this tactic, it is hard to understand how courts in an 
adversarial system can so flippantly waive privilege and immunity.  
Moreover, contrary to all precedential rulings, an opinion of counsel will 
probably remain an important component of the defense against willful 
infringement for the foreseeable future. 
With the continued uncertainty whether the divulgence of an 
opinion of counsel could waive a broad range of trial counsel’s privilege 
and immunities, there are concerns of a chilling effect on important 
194. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1371 (emphasis omitted). 
195.   In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Pracs. Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 309 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)
[T]he calculation is that the attorney-client privilege improves the adversarial 
process without a net loss in the amount of information produced.  Insofar as the 
existence of the privilege creates the communication sought, the exclusion of 
privileged information conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist 
without the privilege.  The absence of the communication would leave the 
adversarial process with no more information and with counsel less able to present 
focused arguments to the courts. 
Id. 
196. “If clients themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that 
they would also have divulged it to their attorneys, even without the protection of the 
privilege.  Thus, once a client has revealed privileged information to a third party, the basic 
justification for the privilege no longer applies.”  Westinghouse Electronic Corp. v. Republic 
of Philippines 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back 
into the Hat:  Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency 
Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982)). 
197. See Moore, supra note 70. 
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disclosures and discussions between the defendant and trial counsel as 
litigants continue to develop more elaborate ruses to prevent the 
disclosure of information subsequent to waiver. 
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